MCP Tools
ArmorClaude's MCP tools for intent plan registration, policy reading, and trust operations
MCP Tools
ArmorClaude exposes 5 MCP tools through the armorclaude-policy MCP server. These are available to Claude during a session - Claude uses them to register plans, read policy, and perform trust operations.
MCP tools are used by Claude (the LLM), not by the user directly. Users manage policy through /armorclaude:armor commands. There is intentionally no policy_update MCP tool - policy mutation is human-only.
policy_read
Read the current policy state.
Input:
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
id | string | No | Specific statement ID to read |
Without id: Returns the full policy state (version, policy JSON, history).
With id: Returns a single policy statement by its ID.
Example output:
{
"version": 3,
"policy": {
"schemaVersion": "armor.policy.v1",
"kind": "PolicyProfile",
"defaults": { "decision": "deny" },
"statements": [
{ "id": "stmt_1", "effect": "permit", "action": { "type": "tool", "eq": "Read" } }
]
}
}register_intent_plan
Declare the tools Claude intends to use for the current task. A restrictive active policy requires a plan for calls that change state. Reads such as Read, Grep, and Glob need no plan but still pass policy checks. Policies with default allow and only permit statements, such as all-allow, capture intent without blocking missing plans or drift. Empty default-deny policies do not qualify.
Input:
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
goal | string | Yes | One-line summary of what the plan accomplishes |
steps | array or JSON string | Yes | Ordered list of tool calls |
plan | object or JSON string | No | Alternative: pass the whole plan as one object |
Each step in the steps array:
| Field | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
action | string | Yes | Tool name (e.g., Read, Edit, Bash, mcp__server__tool) |
description | string | No | Why this step is needed |
arguments | object | No | Expected inputs, advisory while strictParamCheck is false. Use policy conditions for parameter restrictions |
Example input:
{
"goal": "Read and summarize README.md",
"steps": [
{
"action": "Read",
"description": "Read the README file",
"arguments": { "file_path": "/project/README.md" }
}
]
}What happens when called:
- The plan is validated against the intent plan schema
- If signed in, the plan is sent to the ArmorIQ backend for a signed intent token
- The result is stored as
pending-plan.<sessionId>.json, orpending-plan.jsonif no session ID was resolved - The next applicable enforcement-path
PreToolUsehook consumes the pending plan. Read-only fast-path calls may return before this step
A token-request failure can still leave a locally recorded plan. An intent registration response alone does not prove a signed token was issued; inspect the token status in the response. Session routing uses a hook-maintained active-session pointer when the MCP process has no session ID, so concurrent windows do not have a guaranteed race-free routing boundary.
Example output:
Intent registered: 2 steps. Token valid 3600s.trust_revoke
Revoke the currently active intent token. Use when the plan has gone wrong or needs to be stopped immediately.
Input:
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
reason | string | Yes | Why this revocation is happening |
cascade | boolean | No | If true, also revoke child tokens (subtree delegations) |
What happens when called:
- The active session's intent token is located
- A revocation delta is signed and broadcast to the ArmorIQ backend
- Enforcement points apply the revocation as it propagates; there is no fixed fleet-wide deadline guaranteed by the plugin
- The revocation is recorded in the runtime state's trust operation log
Example output:
Token revoked. trustId=tr_abc123 (2 descendants cascaded)trust_reanchor
Re-anchor to an updated plan without revoking the current token. Use when the plan needs to change mid-session (e.g., additional tools needed).
Input:
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
updatedPlan | object | Yes | The revised plan (same schema as register_intent_plan) |
reason | string | No | Why the plan changed - surfaces in the audit timeline |
What happens when called:
- The updated plan is validated
- A delta
δ(h_P → h'_P)is signed, linking the old plan hash to the new one - The working token is re-minted so subsequent tool calls succeed against the new plan
- The tamper-evident lineage is preserved in the IAP audit log
Example output:
ReAnchor recorded. trustId=tr_def456 delta(a1b2c3d4e5f6 → 7890abcd1234)trust_delegate
Issue a subtree-bounded child token with a Merkle inclusion proof. Used for multi-agent scenarios where a sub-agent needs authority over part of the plan.
Input:
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
delegatePublicKey | string | Yes | Public key of the sub-agent |
subtreePath | string | Yes | Plan subtree path (e.g., /steps/[1]) |
validitySeconds | number | No | Override the default validity period |
targetAgent | string | No | Human-readable label for the sub-agent |
What happens when called:
- A child token is minted, scoped to the specified subtree path
- A Merkle inclusion proof is generated, proving the subtree is part of the parent plan
- The sub-agent receives authority confined to the named subtree
- The delegation is recorded in the trust operation log
Example output:
Delegation issued. trustId=tr_ghi789 subtreePath=/steps/[1] (delegationId=del_xyz)Whitelisted Tools
These tools are never blocked by ArmorClaude's intent enforcement (they are needed for the system to function):
register_intent_plan- Claude needs this to declare planspolicy_read- Policy reading (read-only, no mutation)trust_revoke/trust_reanchor/trust_delegate- Trust operationsExitPlanMode- Plan mode approvalToolSearch/TodoWrite/ListMcpResourcesTool/ReadMcpResourceTool- Claude Code internals with no side effects
Verifying MCP Server Connection
Check that the ArmorClaude MCP server is connected:
claude mcp list | grep armorclaudeExpected output:
Look for the installed variant's armorclaude-policy server and its connection status.